Post Office Scandal in the UK: How the giant machinery of government and administration can crush lay people | Part II

The Post Office was absolutely unwilling to entertain any complaint about the Horizon system, though repeatedly similar points were raised by the sub-postmasters from several branches. Its conviction was that software was fault-free; this position was totally unjust, but the Post Department was not ready to see it. This destroyed the lives of more than 1000 people working with the department.

The Legacy Horizon system used by the Post Office incorrectly showed the shortfalls in the branches from the year 2000 ( i.e., hardly within a year of its installation ). Two types of problems with the system were observed:
1) Overstating the amount of cash on hand and stock available in the post office branches.

2) Money posted into the individual accounts disappeared (obviously went to one of the suspense accounts without leaving any trail), and the cause could not be identified. In some cases, substantial money was involved.

The only way to make corrections was to get through the entry logs, but the Sub Postmasters had no access to the logs of transactions or had very limited access. Thus, there was no way to identify the cause and prove that the Sub Postmasters had no role in shortfalls. They were unable to view the detailed system transaction log to understand and rectify the discrepancies. Clear audit trails were not provided by the post office. The system lacked a counter-checking mechanism to rectify transactions and identify potential errors.

Sub Postmasters were expected to record all the transactions accurately and calculate the cash and the stock available at the branch, and enter the detailed statement every month. The Horizon system also calculated and generated the figures of cash in hand and stock with the branch ( that should have been at the individual branches ) after approximately a month.

Once the figures of cash and stock were generated, Sub Postmasters were compelled to accept those figures generated in the system as the official statement. The problem of discrepancy and incorrectly calculated shortfalls was reported, but the department could offer no help to correct the figures. Though Sub Postmasters were not responsible for the shortfalls in the individual accounts, there was no way to prove it. When the paper-based system was in use, the paper trail used to be available for all the transactions. With the use of the Horizon system, the use of paper ended. Probably, even if the Sub Postmasters kept the paper-based trail, it had no official standing. The figures generated by the system were to be accepted as the official statement.

These shortfalls were to be made up by the Sub Postmasters by putting their own money or by asking to deduct the amount from their monthly remuneration as part of their contract. Sub Postmasters were self-employed people who had no fixed remuneration, but their earnings were related to the commission earned on the services they sold. This, too, was part of their contract.

Sub Postmasters raised the issue consistently; they obviously sensed that there was some problem with the system. Obviously Post Office never accepted this claim; there was no support from the system, and the call centre too could offer no respite. Ultimately, the responsibility was with the Sub Postmasters, and the situation made them appear the culprits of fraud or theft.

As there was no access to the transaction log, the system-generated figures could not be challenged. Crucial audit Data detailing every user action, including logs of activities, was with the Fujitsu company. The Post Office had access but never provided the data to the Sub Postmasters. It hoarded the data and prevented Sub Postmasters the access to it. This was the core issue of the Horizon scandal. There were definitely some problems with the system. Those who faced the brunt of the system were deprived of any formal mechanism to challenge or dispute any discrepancy.

There were some flaws and defects ( Bugs) with the system that resulted from the errors, causing the software to behave unexpectedly or incorrectly. They manifested when the system was executed. (For example, if a discount on something offered to customers, it was wrongly calculated. It could also be in the form of incorrect pricing being presented. This probably can be described as a malfunction of the software. This is usually discovered during the testing or pilot runs, can be identified and corrected when it is a small-scale controlled test).

The Post Office never accepted that there were some defects in the system. As audit trails were not produced, it caused disrepute to the operations and definitely weakened trust in the Post Office. It was clear that:

1) Comprehensive validation of the functionality of the system's probability was not done. It was handling the sensitive financial data, so it was essential
2) There was an absence of mechanism for the detection of system errors and resolutions.
3) Communication and accountability were missing in the larger IT system of the Post Office.
4) Recording feedback was not part of the system, which helps in improving the software.

It seems that by doing this, the Post Office was protecting its reputation and probably avoiding the financial liability too. The UK's Post Office also had misplaced trust in the system.

The system fell short of acceptable standards. Post Office, instead of accepting that there were some serious problems with the software, went into denial mode. It did everything to suppress the truth and took action against the Sub Postmasters and the staff involved in the operations. They were prosecuted; the conclusions were drawn based on incomplete evidence to prosecute all for fraud and theft. It maintained that the system was fault-free. Whenever someone complained, the call centre was instructed to state that he was the only one who was experiencing such a problem.

Most of the people were compelled to plead guilty, as they could not prove themselves innocent. Many settled the issue by putting their own money into the accounts. The suffering of Postmasters had no bounds. This had a disastrous impact on their lives.

13 people were reported to have taken their lives, unfortunately (6 Sub Postmasters and 7 others related to the case), 59 contemplated suicide at various points in their lives after prosecution, and 10 made failed attempts to end their lives on the number of occasions. A lady confessed that she was pregnant when she was prosecuted, it deterred her from taking any extreme step, else she could have taken her life. Some noted that there was unbearable stress, and some even had a mental breakdown. Some turned alcoholic, sank into depression. Many had psychiatric and psychological problems, their life was ruined, many became bankrupt, had to borrow or sell their belongings, and as a result, lost their livelihood. Most of them had serious health issues, and their marriages had broken down. Seeing or meeting old customers frightened them; they could not face them.

All these cases and social consequences were ignored completely. Surprisingly, these things did not awaken the post department; it was busy defending its stand.

In 2009, Computer Weekly reported the issues related to the entire phenomenon for the first time and claimed that there were underlying faults with the Horizon system. People who faced prosecution were trying to fight out their cases at the individual level; they formed a group to fight the department. It took 2 decades for this protracted battle to gain some momentum. For a long period, the Post Office fiercely defended itself, which resulted in the conviction of as many as 700 Sub Postmasters. The total number is probably 1000; only 50-60 were not convicted. Those who came out of jail could not get a job later because of their jail records. They were suspended and their contracts were terminated. They were left helpless.

All pleaded that they were not at fault for the unexplained losses. The question is, why would they steal their own money when they knew that they were fully responsible for any loss? The Post Office spent a huge amount to defend the undefendable. No logic worked.

More about the battle of people and the efforts to suppress and prevent them from bringing the rot into light in the next part.