Was Naxalism really declining under the UPA? The data, action says otherwise
NewsBharati 11-Apr-2026 12:11:42 PM
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As many as 76 CRPF jawans were killed in Dantewada (Chhattisgarh) on April 6, 2010. It was the deadliest Maoist attack in India’s history. The cruelty of the violence shocked the nation. Even in the face of escalating violence, the Centre’s response was weak. No major policy shifts, no clear political accountability. Things continued as before. It was just another regular day in New Delhi.
The pattern repeated in May 2013. In the Darbha Valley, Naxalites carried out a brutal ambush on a Congress convoy, killing 29 people. Mahendra Karma and other senior Congress leaders were killed by Maoists. Despite losing its own leaders, the Congress-led UPA government showed little urgency to change its approach.
These deadliest Maoist attacks took place after the then Manmohan Singh government had already launched ‘Operation Green Hunt’. The said operation was touted as the biggest anti-Naxal action. The attacks, however, exposed the gap between loosely planned strategy and ground reality. The system failed to anticipate and prevent this attack. And, who was blamed for this failure of the Centre’s operation? State Government!
The problem was not about the lack of policy shift but the mindset of Congress leaders. They were either sympathetic to, or soft on, the Naxal cause. For example, veteran Congress leader Digvijaya Singh, then considered a close confidant of Sonia Gandhi, called Naxals ‘misguided patriots’. This reflected the policy confusion that defined the UPA’s approach. Congress leaders could not make up their minds whether Naxals were a grave threat or merely misguided people.
‘Operation Green Hunt’ was plagued by poor coordination and inadequate resources. It lacked unified political backing. The then Home Minister P Chidambaram faced open attacks from within his own party. Digvijaya Singh repeatedly undermined the operation. He publicly questioned the rationale behind the operation, labelling it a misguided, repressive approach. He called for dialogue with Maoists instead. He even called Chidambaram ‘intellectually arrogant’ due to disagreements over the operation. The UPA was unable to decide whether it was with itself or against itself.
The government's close aides were in touch with far-Left activists, who often downplayed Naxalite violence and framed it as a response to state oppression. The National Advisory Council (NAC), chaired by Sonia Gandhi, included several members with radical far-Left views. They were vocally critical of strong state action against Naxals.
The then-Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh identified Naxalism as ‘India’s greatest internal security threat’ in 2009. But his government’s actions never matched the urgency of that declaration.
It’s no surprise that during much of the UPA years, Left-wing extremist violence actually escalated. In 2004, when the UPA came to power, there were 1,533 reported incidents of LWE violence and 566 deaths. By 2010, under its watch, the number of incidents rose to 2,213, and deaths nearly doubled to 1,005. The broader trend was even more telling. Between 2004 and 2014, India recorded 17,679 LWE-related incidents, resulting in 6,984 deaths, including 3,061 civilians and 1,846 security personnel. In contrast, 2015 to 2024 saw a sharp decline to 6,995 incidents and 1,929 deaths. There were significantly lower casualties among both civilians (1,451) and security forces (478).
Despite the consistent bloodshed, the UPA failed to develop a comprehensive, long-term strategy to dismantle the Maoist network or to tackle the ideological roots of extremism.
Calling Naxals ‘the single biggest internal security threat’ is not enough. Actions matter for national security. Why wait till 2009 to call it an internal security threat? Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had sent a team under the then Member-Secretary of the Planning Commission for field-level studies of Naxal-affected areas in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh in the 1980s. They could have easily prevented this threat.
An important indicator of performance on the anti-Naxalite front is the number of surrenders. Why was the surrender of Naxalites low, if the surrender and rehabilitation policy was so robust during the UPA era? As per the data, during the 2004-2013 period, 3,971 Naxalites surrendered in the country. Whereas, from 2014-2026 (till March 2026), a total of 14,291 surrendered. So, it is not only about having a policy, but implementing it aggressively. Besides, merely identifying the threat of Naxalites is not enough. It takes a multi-agency approach to eliminate the supreme commander of the Maoists, as happened in 2025.
To say the present government is merely finishing the UPA’s work is like saying a marathon runner who stopped midway is responsible for the victory of the runner who crossed the finish line.
The pattern repeated in May 2013. In the Darbha Valley, Naxalites carried out a brutal ambush on a Congress convoy, killing 29 people. Mahendra Karma and other senior Congress leaders were killed by Maoists. Despite losing its own leaders, the Congress-led UPA government showed little urgency to change its approach.
These deadliest Maoist attacks took place after the then Manmohan Singh government had already launched ‘Operation Green Hunt’. The said operation was touted as the biggest anti-Naxal action. The attacks, however, exposed the gap between loosely planned strategy and ground reality. The system failed to anticipate and prevent this attack. And, who was blamed for this failure of the Centre’s operation? State Government!
The problem was not about the lack of policy shift but the mindset of Congress leaders. They were either sympathetic to, or soft on, the Naxal cause. For example, veteran Congress leader Digvijaya Singh, then considered a close confidant of Sonia Gandhi, called Naxals ‘misguided patriots’. This reflected the policy confusion that defined the UPA’s approach. Congress leaders could not make up their minds whether Naxals were a grave threat or merely misguided people.
‘Operation Green Hunt’ was plagued by poor coordination and inadequate resources. It lacked unified political backing. The then Home Minister P Chidambaram faced open attacks from within his own party. Digvijaya Singh repeatedly undermined the operation. He publicly questioned the rationale behind the operation, labelling it a misguided, repressive approach. He called for dialogue with Maoists instead. He even called Chidambaram ‘intellectually arrogant’ due to disagreements over the operation. The UPA was unable to decide whether it was with itself or against itself.
The government's close aides were in touch with far-Left activists, who often downplayed Naxalite violence and framed it as a response to state oppression. The National Advisory Council (NAC), chaired by Sonia Gandhi, included several members with radical far-Left views. They were vocally critical of strong state action against Naxals.
The then-Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh identified Naxalism as ‘India’s greatest internal security threat’ in 2009. But his government’s actions never matched the urgency of that declaration.
It’s no surprise that during much of the UPA years, Left-wing extremist violence actually escalated. In 2004, when the UPA came to power, there were 1,533 reported incidents of LWE violence and 566 deaths. By 2010, under its watch, the number of incidents rose to 2,213, and deaths nearly doubled to 1,005. The broader trend was even more telling. Between 2004 and 2014, India recorded 17,679 LWE-related incidents, resulting in 6,984 deaths, including 3,061 civilians and 1,846 security personnel. In contrast, 2015 to 2024 saw a sharp decline to 6,995 incidents and 1,929 deaths. There were significantly lower casualties among both civilians (1,451) and security forces (478).
Despite the consistent bloodshed, the UPA failed to develop a comprehensive, long-term strategy to dismantle the Maoist network or to tackle the ideological roots of extremism.
Calling Naxals ‘the single biggest internal security threat’ is not enough. Actions matter for national security. Why wait till 2009 to call it an internal security threat? Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had sent a team under the then Member-Secretary of the Planning Commission for field-level studies of Naxal-affected areas in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh in the 1980s. They could have easily prevented this threat.
An important indicator of performance on the anti-Naxalite front is the number of surrenders. Why was the surrender of Naxalites low, if the surrender and rehabilitation policy was so robust during the UPA era? As per the data, during the 2004-2013 period, 3,971 Naxalites surrendered in the country. Whereas, from 2014-2026 (till March 2026), a total of 14,291 surrendered. So, it is not only about having a policy, but implementing it aggressively. Besides, merely identifying the threat of Naxalites is not enough. It takes a multi-agency approach to eliminate the supreme commander of the Maoists, as happened in 2025.
To say the present government is merely finishing the UPA’s work is like saying a marathon runner who stopped midway is responsible for the victory of the runner who crossed the finish line.
Anjali Ankad
Anjali Ankad has completed graduation in Journalism and Mass Communication and Masters in Journalism. While working as a sub-editor to Newsbharati, she aims to make her hand robust on sports.