Allahabad HC clarifies Places of Worship Act does not bar acquisition of Mosques or other religious properties for public projects, here's what the court order reads
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In a significant ruling with implications for the interpretation of the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, the Allahabad High Court has held that the law was enacted solely to prevent the conversion of the religious character of places of worship and does not curtail the State's sovereign power to acquire religious properties, including mosques, for genuine public purposes.
The Bench categorically rejected the argument that the Act creates absolute immunity for religious properties from acquisition.
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The Bench observed that the objective of the 1991 Act is the preservation of communal harmony by maintaining the religious character of places of worship as they stood on 15 August 1947, and not to create a legal embargo on infrastructure development or other public projects undertaken in accordance with law. Since the petitioners were merely tenants and shopkeepers without proprietary rights over the acquired land, the Court held that they lacked the legal standing to challenge the acquisition on behalf of the concerned mosques or the Waqf authorities. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed.
The judgment assumes significance amid continuing legal and political debates over the interpretation of the Places of Worship Act. While the Act has frequently been invoked in disputes involving religious sites, the Allahabad High Court has clarified that its protection is confined to preserving the religious character of places of worship and does not dilute the State's constitutional power to acquire land for legitimate public purposes, subject to due process and payment of compensation.
Dismissing a writ petition filed by tenants and shopkeepers seeking to halt a road widening project and restrain the proposed acquisition of six mosques, the Court ruled that acquisition under the doctrine of eminent domain cannot be equated with altering the religious character of a place of worship.
A Division Bench comprising Justice J.J. Munir and Justice Arun Kumar observed that the 1991 Act preserves the religious identity of places of worship as it existed on 15 August 1947, but does not place religious properties beyond the reach of land acquisition laws.
"A temple on 15th August, 1947, cannot be converted to a church or a mosque, and likewise, a mosque or a church to a temple. The purport of the Act of 1991 is not to place beyond the authority of the State's right... to acquire and use land for any public purpose," the Court observed. The petitioners had argued that the proposed acquisition of six mosques violated the Places of Worship Act because the religious structures existed prior to Independence. The State, however, contended that the acquisition was being carried out under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, for a road expansion project and that neither the Places of Worship Act nor the Waqf Act prohibited such acquisition.
Accepting the State's contention, the High Court held that Sections 3 and 4 of the Places of Worship Act must be read harmoniously. It observed that the legislation prohibits the conversion of a place of worship from one religion to another or between different sects, but does not prohibit the acquisition of religious land for secular public purposes such as infrastructure development.
The Bench categorically rejected the argument that the Act creates absolute immunity for religious properties from acquisition.
"The Act of 1991 prohibits the conversion of a place of worship of one religious denomination into another. It does not derogate from the State's authority to acquire any place of religious worship for a secular and public purpose, like development of a road or augmentation of infrastructure," the Court held. The Court further examined the provisions of the Waqf Act and observed that the legislation itself recognises that waqf properties may be acquired for public purposes, subject to statutory safeguards and consultation with the Waqf Board. Consequently, it found no conflict between the Waqf Act and the Places of Worship Act.
Significantly, the High Court relied upon the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India (1994), which held that mosques do not enjoy immunity from acquisition merely because they are places of worship. Reaffirming that principle, the Bench noted that every immovable property, including religious properties, remains subject to acquisition under the law for legitimate public purposes.
The Court also endorsed the Bombay High Court's decision in Yusuf Ajij Shaikh v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (1995), which held that the Places of Worship Act was enacted only to prevent illegal conversion of places of worship by one community into another and was never intended to override land acquisition laws.
The Bench observed that the objective of the 1991 Act is the preservation of communal harmony by maintaining the religious character of places of worship as they stood on 15 August 1947, and not to create a legal embargo on infrastructure development or other public projects undertaken in accordance with law. Since the petitioners were merely tenants and shopkeepers without proprietary rights over the acquired land, the Court held that they lacked the legal standing to challenge the acquisition on behalf of the concerned mosques or the Waqf authorities. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed.
The judgment assumes significance amid continuing legal and political debates over the interpretation of the Places of Worship Act. While the Act has frequently been invoked in disputes involving religious sites, the Allahabad High Court has clarified that its protection is confined to preserving the religious character of places of worship and does not dilute the State's constitutional power to acquire land for legitimate public purposes, subject to due process and payment of compensation.